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This article describes levels and long-term trends of
business and individual insolvency in a country-com-
parative perspective. The developments are inter-
preted with respect to the characteristics (and the
existence) of statutory insolvency rules.
Long-term developments of insolvencies
Figure 1 depicts the long-term development of all in-
solvencies,business and personal.The countries select-
ed are those for which longer-term data exist and
where the reported data differentiate between cases of
business and personal insolvency. In order to make
meaningful comparisons, the raw data on insolvencies
must be normalised.Such a normalisation may take in-
to account different country specificities, like popula-
tion, number of businesses or average business size in
terms of employees. Throughout the article the num-
ber of insolvencies is related to one million inhabitants.
All countries show fluctuations and a more or less
pronounced upward trend.The exception is Sweden
where only a (strong) fluctuation but not an upward
trend is visible.The insolvency figures for the US and
Canada are not only much higher than they are for
the other countries, but they also seem to exhibit a
higher growth dynamic. The latter is not the case,
however, as the compound annual growth rates are
highest by far for Germany (9.6 percent), while the
other countries rank between 4.3 percent (Canada,
with the lowest) and 6.4 percent (Australia).
Business insolvencies
Figure 1 comprises two quite different cases of insol-
vency, those of businesses and of individuals, and,
thus, may not be too meaningful. Figure 2 is only
about business insolvency. Sweden is a remarkable
case, exhibiting a virtual eruption and later a strong
decrease in business insolvencies between 1988 and
1998.Next to Sweden is France,with a long-term up-
ward trend of business insolvencies and an ampli-
tude – the latter occurring approximately in the
same period as in Sweden.
The developments in the remain-
ing countries can be seen more
easily when Sweden and France
are excluded from the picture
(Figure 3).The most striking fea-
ture is the high degree of fluctua-
tion in all countries – plausibly
related to the country-specific
business cycle. Obvious trends
exist for Germany, Canada and
the US. Business insolvencies in
Germany have been on a nearly
continuous and strong rise since
the beginning of the 1990s (re-
unification with East Germany).
By contrast, a downward trend is
* The author is researcher at the Ifo Institute for Economic Re-
search, Munich (osterkamp@ifo.de). For helpful comments on an
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Figure 1visible in the case of Canada, at least from the 1990s
onwards. A clear and nearly continuous downward
trend,however,has occurred in the US since the late
1980s. In 2005, the US figure for business insolven-
cies per million inhabitants is the lowest of the coun-
tries considered here.
The fluctuations of business insolvencies, as depicted
in Figures 2 and 3, can largely be interpreted in terms
of the business cycle. The very strong amplitude of
Swedish business insolvencies, e.g., also roughly coin-
cides with the drastic measures of fiscal reforms and
restructuring of the Swedish economy. Explaining the
different levels across countries, however, is more dif-
ficult.A plausible approach is to relate business insol-
vencies to the respective national insolvency laws.
One should be aware that the legal provisions for 
cases of business insolvency affect much more than
only the number of insolvencies treated according to
the officially prescribed legal rules.Instead,the behav-
iour of firms is affected by the law
in a multitude of ways. Moreover,
not only the number of insolvency
cases but also the quality of the
outcome – from a debtor, a credi-
tor and a social point of view – is
affected.Box 1 lists some of the ar-
eas influenced by the law.
It should be noted that even the
official statistical recording of
cases as “insolvency” (or “bank-
ruptcy”, for that matter) is affect-
ed (item 3 in Box 1).
Not only is business behaviour in-
fluenced by the insolvency law in
many ways, the law itself is multi-
dimensional. In order to charac-
terise insolvency laws and to com-
pare them across countries,Wood
(1995) has identified 7 main and 
a total of 11 fields of properties of
such laws. In a more recent at-
tempt, David Smith and Ström-
berg (2005) have developed a tax-
onomy which entails 8 main and a
total of 25 fields of properties of
insolvency laws (see Box 2).























































































































































































































































The impact of insolvency laws on business behaviour
and outcome
The design (even the existence) of an insolvency law in-
fluences …
1. Business behaviour
• which legal form is chosen for the enterprise
• how a project is financed (equity or debt)
• the availability of credit and the interest rate level
• how risky the chosenprojects are 
• how much effort the management exerts to avoid in-
solvency – or whether bankruptcy is even regardedand
usedas a management strategy 
(opportunistic behaviour)
• thus, how often insolvencies occur
• how cases of insolvency are resolved
– guided by the rules of the bankruptcy law
– or settled by bargaining (using self-created rules)
2. Quality of the outcome
• what the quality of the procedure is, in terms of:
– extent of premature (not necessary) liquidations
(instead of restructuring and/or provision of fresh
money)
– extent of retarded(but truly necessary) liquidations 
– recovery rate for the creditors 
– potential for a fresh start of the failed enterprise
3. Registering and classificationof cases of insolvency 
Source: authorCESifo DICE Report 1/2006 29
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This impressive list may even be extended, for in-
stance by the costs of the procedure and whether the
court has to open a procedure or can decide not to do
so. In Germany, for example, the costs of an insolven-
cy procedure are considered as relatively high and the
courts may not take up the case when the remaining
assets do not cover the costs of the procedure.
With the help of their taxonomy, David Smith and
Strömberg (2005) provide systematically structured
and detailed information about the business insol-
vency regulations in six countries. A similar recent
attempt has been undertaken by Davydenko and
Franks (2005) for four countries. Their taxonomy,
however, is much more condensed.The information
provided is contained in Table 1.
Table 1 also contains two lines for scores that have
been assigned to the general creditor friendliness of
the national insolvency rules.It is often assumed that
debtor (creditor) friendly insolvency laws lead to a
higher (lower) number of insolvency cases – at least
with respect to the number of those cases that are
treated within the established procedure (and not
outside, i.e. by mutual consent between debtor and
creditor(s) and according to self-created rules). The
assumption is plausible because a debtor friendly
law establishes property rights that are advanta-
geous for the debtor in terms of debt write-off and
the possibility for a “fresh start”.Thus, an enterprise
under a debtor friendly law may have stronger in-
centives (or weaker disincentives) to fail,and a failed
enterprise may more often use the existing regula-
tions which are – in a sense – at its disposal.
We now compare the scores for creditor friendliness
with Figures 2 and 3. The UK gets high scores for
creditor friendliness by both sources and ranks low
in terms of number of insolvencies. Also France fits
well into the picture. Both sources regard the credi-
tor friendliness as low and France has a relatively
high level of insolvencies. For Germany, the sources
are unanimous concerning the relatively high credi-
tor friendliness of the German system (before the
1999 reform). However, the number of insolvency
cases has been spurred not only since re-unification
(under the old system) but also after the insolvency
reform of 1999 and is presently third behind Sweden
and France.The degree of creditor friendliness of the
US system is assessed quite differently by the au-
thors. While Wood gives a medium score, the other
authors’ score is much more on the debtor friendly
side.However,US business insolvency cases are on a
long-term decline and presently lowest of the coun-
tries in our sample (Figure 3).
It is also plausible to assume that the degree of cred-
itor friendliness influences the recovery rate (last
line in Table 1; see also Box 1). Again we have two
sources. For the UK, France and Germany both
sources are unanimous: the average recovery rate is
highest in the UK and lowest in France – which cor-
responds well to the countries’ degree of creditor/
debtor friendliness.However,the US falls out of line
in this case because a high recovery rate (according
to the World Bank) coexists with a regime of low to
medium creditor friendliness.
That recovery rates under debtor friendly rules are
lower is plausible – but only at first glance, because
creditors are able to adjust their lending behaviour
accordingly.They can be more prudent, can demand
higher collateral and can focus on those types of col-
lateral that are not subject to dilution by preferential
creditors.The latter type of collateral is,in the case of
France,the debtor’s receivables.Other collateral is at
Box 2
Taxonomy of corporate bankruptcy codes
Basic characteristics of the laws 
• National denomination of “liquidation” code
• National denomination of “reorganisation” code
• Year of last change 
Verification mechanisms
Coordination mechanisms
• Automatic stay of assets in reorganisation?
• Automatic stay of assets in liquidation?
• Voting rules for approval of reorganisation plan
• Flexibility in defining voting classes in
reorganisation
• Limits on debt write-downs in reorganisation
• Cram-down in reorganisations
• Creditor committees
Protection of third party claimants
• Wage guarantee? 
• Procedure should aim towards preserving
 employment?
• Priority of wages? 
Maintaining asset value
• Possession of assets in liquidation 
• Possessionof assets in reorganisation
• Seniority of new financing in reorganisation?
• Time limits to reorganisation?
• Time limits to liquidation?
Liquidity and disposal of assets
• Exchange of debt for other securities possible
 in reorganisation?
• Sales mechanism in liquidation?
• Auctioneer/trustee incentive compatible? 
• Limits on whom assets can be sold/transferred to?
First-mover advantages
• Debtor has advantage in filing? 
• Who submits reorganisation plan?
Source: David Smith and Strömberg (2005) .the disposal of the insolvency courts and may be sold
by them below the highest bid – in order to preserve
employment. Davydenko and Franks (2005) show,
first, that French banks, indeed, adjust to the debtor
friendly environment. In comparison to the UK and
to Germany, French banks demand more collateral
per euro of debt and choose other types of collater-
al.Secondly,the authors point to the fact that the sig-
nificantly different lending behaviour does,however,
only mitigate, not eliminate, the differences in out-
comes: recovery rates are lower and insolvencies
more often in France than in the UK or Germany.
While Davydenko and Franks’ analysis is based on a
large number of insolvency cases studied in detail
but occurred in three countries only, Claessens and
Klapper (2005) study the insolvency rules and the
number of bankruptcy filings of a large number of
countries. The index of creditor rights they use has
been developed by La Porta et al. (1998). It consists
of 4 sub-indices:restrictive reorganisation,mandatory
management turnover, no automatic stay and secured
creditors priority.Claessens and Klapper come to the
conclusion that the frequency of bankruptcy filings
(1) does not clearly correlate with the level of credi-
tor rights,(2) that there is,however,a positive corre-
lation with an efficiently functioning general judicial
system, and (3) with restrictions to reorganisation.
They find (4) that bankruptcy filings are negatively
correlated with no automatic stay – i.e., automatic
stay of assets, as in the US under Chapter 11 (see
Table 1), increases the frequency of filings.
The extraordinarily high level of business insolven-
cies in Sweden is explained by Buttwill (2004) part-
ly with the high share of insolvencies of “zero em-
ployee enterprises”. Such “enterprises” when failed
are most probably counted as “individual insolven-
cy” in the statistics of other countries. This also fits
well with the fact that the official records of cases of
individual insolvency are extremely low in Sweden
(see below).
A further possible factor influencing the frequency
of business insolvency is payment behaviour. As
Creditreform (2006) reports, there are indeed con-
siderable differences in payment behaviour across
European countries (Table 2). Terms of credit plus
delays of payment add up to an average of 89 days in
Italy and to 37 days in Sweden. But again, the table
CESifo DICE Report 1/2006 30
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 Table 1 
Business bankruptcy procedures, creditor friendliness and recovery rates in France, Germany, UK, and the US
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is only partly able to explain the different insolvency
levels.Sweden and Switzerland (the latter not shown
in the figures of this article), both with very high in-
solvency levels, rank low or middle in the number of
credit and delay days.
The frequency of bankruptcy cases may also be influ-
enced by the average size of enterprises, their size
distribution, the available legal
forms for enterprises and the sec-
tor structure of the economy. We
only provide information about
the sector structure of business
insolvencies (Figure 4). This sec-
tor structure (for 2005) is remark-
ably similar between countries.In
all countries considered industry
insolvencies account for the low-
est share of all insolvencies, while
the highest frequency of insolven-
cies occurs either in the service or
the trade sector. The construction
sector, however, contrary to the
anecdotal evidence, is not a lead-
ing insolvency sector but is on the
second lowest rank in all coun-
tries (except UK).
Personal insolvencies
As we have seen, the driving fac-
tor behind the general growth dy-
namics of total insolvencies, de-
picted in Figure 1,cannot be busi-
ness insolvency, because this type
of insolvency does not exhibit a
significantly increasing trend in
most countries (see Figure 2). Fi-
gure 5 shows that the decisive
factor for the overall growth trends as well as for the
differences of insolvency levels across countries is in-
dividual insolvency. Compound annual growth rates
of individual insolvencies are considerably higher
than those of total insolvencies. Germany and the
Netherlands lead the list with 2-digit growth rates,
while the US and Canada are on lower ranks.
The levels of individual insolvencies per million pop-
ulation reached in 2005 are very different.The high-
est figure by far occurs in the US, while Canada fol-
lows at quite a distance.Germany,UK and Australia,
being next in ranking, have individual insolvency
cases of only about 15 percent of the US level. The
contrast between levels of business and of individual
insolvencies is most striking in the US and Sweden.
While the US in 2005 exhibits the lowest level of
business insolvencies (Figure 3), its level of individ-
ual insolvencies is highest. In Sweden it is just the
other way round:the Swedish level of business insol-
vencies is highest, but the level of individual insol-
Table 2 
Payment behaviour in Europe
Country Terms of credit plus factual



















































































































































USA Compound annual growth rates








Figure 5vencies is lowest – and even declining (annual com-
pound growth of –5.5 percent).
Figure 6, without the US and Canada, allows a clos-
er look at the interesting case of Germany,where the
insolvency figures have been exploding since 2001.
The reform of the insolvency procedure in 1999 had
also introduced the possibility of debt cancellation
for insolvent non-business individuals. Immediately,
the insolvency figures reacted and doubled within
two years. A virtual explosion started after the new
law was reformed in 2001. The annual compound
growth rate for 1999–2005 is more than 40 percent in
the case of Germany.
To explain the general trend of steep increases in in-
dividual (or: consumer) insolvency, two main factors
have been identified. First, consumer debt, mostly
unsecured, developed dramatically in industrial
countries. This is mainly due to technical develop-
ments as well as legal deregulation in the capital
markets (Tabb 2005).Second,an important aspect of
any (modern, in contrast to medieval or nineteenth
century) insolvency law is debt discharge.If a law ex-
ists that permits such a discharge, it will be used by
the debtors.
Box 3 provides information on the introduction of
individual insolvency laws and their reforms across
industrial countries. Since 1984, as Tabb (2005) ob-
serves, a virtual wave of individual insolvency laws
has occurred. In nearly all cases, a debtor friendly
legislation has been introduced or the existing laws
have been made more debtor friendly. The excep-
tions seem to be only the US and Canada. Already
for more than a hundred years (since 1898) the US
had a generous (i.e., debtor friendly) individual in-
solvency law. It had been modified several times in
order to limit abuse, but provided, until recently,“…
broad access to an immediate and unconditional dis-
charge of debts, unhampered even by a correspond-
ing requirement of future income contribution”
(Tabb 2005,p.2).It is only the 2005 reform in the US
and the 1997 reform in Canada that has taken signif-
icant steps in the direction of reduced debtor friend-
liness. Thus, two opposing trends are observable:
generous laws are made less generous (more restric-
tive), restrictive laws (as until recently in most coun-
tries) are made more generous for the debtor.
Opportunistic behaviour, social welfare
It is plausible to assume that the possibility of debt dis-
charge leads to opportunistic behaviour – by enter-
prises and by individuals.The unprecedented steep in-
crease in individual insolvencies immediately after the
introduction of a debt discharge
legislation, as is the case for in-
stance in Germany, cannot suffi-
ciently be explained by rising un-
employment (in Germany: stag-
nating, albeit at a high level), ris-
ing interest rates (stagnating at a
low level) or rising consumer debt
(much less increase).Tabb (2005),
however,refers to such considera-
tions as an “‘abuse’ mantra” (p. 7),
pointing to a number of studies
which have tried to call into ques-
tion a significant occurrence of
opportunistic behaviour of con-
sumers seeking easy debt dis-



























































































































Individual insolvency legislation since 1984 
1984 Denmark, United States
1985 Scotland
1986 England and Wales
1989 France 
1992 Canada, Norway 
1993 Finland
1994 Austria, Germany, Sweden, United States






2002 Australia, England and Wales
2005 United States
Source: Tabb, 2005.CESifo DICE Report 1/2006 33
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charge. Zywicki (2005), by contrast, regards the view
that household overindebtedness is caused by over-
lending of banks and adverse income shocks due to
unemployment or health problems as the “tradition-
al model”that can no longer satisfactorily explain the
consumer bankruptcy trends.He concludes:“Individ-
uals increasingly appear to be choosing (italics in the
original, R.O.) to file for bankruptcy as a response to
financial distress, rather than reducing spending or
tapping savings to avoid bankruptcy” (p. 2).
The possibility of an individual debt discharge can be
regarded as consumer insurance because it smooths
consumption paths over time. Grant and Koeniger
(2005) set this in relation to redistributive taxation
and to public welfare programmes, both of which al-
so smooth consumption paths.(The relation between
redistributive taxation and social insurance was ex-
plored already in 1980 by Varian.) For the US, with
state level data, the authors try to show that redis-
tributive taxation and debt discharge legislation are
substitutes, not complements. They even identify a
“policy trade-off in that bankruptcy exemption (i.e.,
debtor’s assets exempted from payment obligations,
R.O.) is less effective in increasing welfare if redis-
tributive taxation is already pronounced” (p. 29).
They go on to set the recent wave of individual in-
solvency laws in Europe in perspective to the al-
ready existing substantial public assistance pro-
grammes in Europe and conclude that, from a social
welfare point of view,“the additional insurance pro-
vided by these reforms is unlikely to be important …
in these European countries” (p. 30).
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